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The Perils of Prenuptial Financial Agreements in Australia: Effectiveness and 
Professional Negligence 
 
By Professor John Wade 
Bond University 
 
 
Legal practitioners in Australia who draft financial agreements before (s 90B; 90UB) or 
during a marriage or relationship (s 90C; 90UC) have a high risk of being guilty of 
professional negligence. Vigilance, protocols and expertise only reduce the risk; it is never 
eliminated. That is why a number of experienced and smart family lawyers in Australia will 
never draft pre-nuptial (s 90B; 90UB) or “during relationship” agreements. They send their 
clients to more naïve or risk-taking lawyers. In each case, the professional negligence and 
ineffective agreements lie dormant and hidden like hand grenades. The agreements will 
explode over say the 30 years which follow signing – either upon the separation of the 
signatory spouses, or the death of one, or a dramatic change of circumstances for better or 
worse of one of the spouses. 
That is, it is very likely given normal patterns of marital life, that the majority of such 
financial agreements (pre-nuptial or during relationship) will be subsequently re-examined 
by critical eyes searching for loopholes.  
Will the vast majority of such re-examined financial agreements be actually or potentially 
“nonbinding”; and will lawyers be blamed? Yes. The following chart sets out a cumulative 
list of what a binding prenuptial or during relationship agreement legally “requires”, or may 
be required by the time the agreement is re-examined!, and matches each actual or 
potential requirement with the contrary standard pattern of human behaviour. These 
“standard patterns” are only derived anecdotally by the author from conversations and 
conferences with family lawyers around Australia.  It is unlikely that many lawyers will 
formally admit in a formal survey (other than by their professional insurers)to the host of 
“errors”, or at least risks, contained in their ticking and closed prenup cabinets? 
The author acknowledges that every proposition set out below leads to debate about 
wandering precedents and “common practice”. Some lawyers argue with unconvincing 
enthusiasm that their own drafting and protocols surrounding prenups are risk-free or 
bulletproof.   Their speeches have a hollow ring in the current sea of uncertainty, and the 
revised defensive practices of some specialist family law firms. 
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“Legal and/or Avoiding Professional 
Negligence Requirements” 
Reality? 
1. The terms of a pre-nuptial 
agreement should arguably (and 
arguably is risk enough?) reflect 
what orders would be made under s 
79 of the FLA in order to avoid the 
easy implication of duress, or 
mental instability; or 
misunderstanding; superficial legal 
advice, or   “unconscionable 
conduct” (FLA, s 90K(1)(e)).  
Additionally, due process protection 
of the weaker spouse should 
multiply in time and expense in 
direct proportion to the substantive 
unfairness of the agreement 
( beware a pro forma list of recitals). 
See now Thorne v Kennedy [2017] 
HCA 49, where multiple pressures to 
sign a one-sided agreement held to 
be “undue influence”. Additionally, 
agreements “in the broad s.79 
range” are arguably a prerequisite 
to the court power in s.90 G(1A) to 
“remedy” technical and other 
defects.   
1. In the vast majority of agreements, 
one spouse contracts to be paid far 
less than (s)he would receive under 
s 79 of the FLA. Moreover, the 
“stronger” spouse is not expressly 
advised in writing that failure to 
provide “within the broad FLA 
range”, possibly/probably 
destabilises the agreement in the 
variety of ways listed.   
Moreover, the stronger spouse does 
not insist upon proportionally more 
rigorous documented and expensive 
advice for the weaker spouse. ( ie 
insist on a greater degree of 
“informed” consent). 
2. The terms of a pre-nuptial 
agreement should provide 
staggered increases of payments 
based at least on the duration of the 
relationship in order to reflect 
ranges under s 79 of FLA. For 
example, gradually increasing 
amounts of cash for the first three 
years reflecting the “short 
marriage” cases, then gradually 
increasing percentages for the next 
two years etc. 
2. Few do; at least because the 
drafting of such a “time formula” is 
so complex, expensive and time 
consuming. 
3. Clients must make carefully 
documented full disclosure of assets  
(FLA, s 90K(1); plus independent 
valuation of major assets is highly 
recommended. 
3. Many clients are in too much haste; 
and want to avoid expense. 
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4. The drafting and final signatures of 
a pre-nuptial agreement should take 
place at least two months before 
cohabitation or a wedding – to 
reduce error; reduce the implication 
of duress and uninformed consent. 
4. The majority are not prepared and 
signed “early”. ( eg Thorne v 
Kennedy: “sign or the forthcoming 
wedding in eleven days is off.”) 
5. As a relationship survives, the pre-
nuptial or “during relationship” 
agreement should have a sunset 
clause (say every five years), so that 
new financial arrangements can be 
made which more closely reflect the 
range under s 79 of the FLA. 
5. Few do. Such a clause would give 
the standardly exploited partner 
multiple opportunities to negotiate 
for more money; with a brilliant 
fallback position of “oh well, I will 
just rely on s 79 of the FLA if we 
ever separate”. Alternatively, if 
negotiations fail during the specified 
period, one spouse could 
consciously decide to separate 
before that period expired - a 
dramatic fallback position every five 
years? 
6. Financial agreements can be set 
aside under the express terms of 
FLA when “normal” life events 
occur, such as birth of a child;  
serious illness of a child; change of 
caregiving of a child; unemployment 
or serious illness of a caregiver of a 
child(s 90K; 90 UM – “material 
change” re child). 
6. Drafters attempt to negate the 
effect of these standard life events 
by inserting a clause saying that the 
parties foresee all these events, in 
the hope that the agreement will 
prevail over them all. Clearly such 
clauses are ineffective and do not 
trump the legislation. 
7. Clients who sign such standardly 
one-sided agreements must be 
emotionally stable and give 
“informed consent”. 
7. Many are not. Moreover, their own 
lawyers write copious self-serving 
and protective notes on the file to 
provide neat evidence that their 
own client was unstable, hurried, 
under pressure and signed despite 
clearly being advised not to do so!! 
This evidentiary time bomb is of 
course kept secret, and the other 
spouse has no idea that he has 
signed an ineffective agreement!  
8. If a lawyer’s independent statement 
is challenged by either spouse, the 
Family Court will investigate what 
advice was actually given and heard 
in BOTH lawyers’ offices years 
before. That is, the written 
certificates of advice of BOTH 
lawyers about “advantages” and 
8. Many lawyers read through the 
draft agreement with the client in 
less than an hour; sign the bland 
statement of advantages and 
disadvantages; and keep no 
abundant notes or videos of the 
specific advantages and 
disadvantages discussed; partly to 
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“disadvantages” are not conclusive 
that such advice was accurately 
given! (Hoult [2011] Fam CA 1023; 
Parker and Parker [2012] FamCAFC 
33; contra Benjamin J in Wallace 
and Stelzer (2011) FamCA 54). 
Therefore before spouses sign, both 
lawyers must witness the hand over 
to each other and to their own 
clients, a copy of a particular letter 
or video of advice given, in simple 
language, which explains the effect 
of the agreement and the 
advantages and disadvantages of 
entering the agreement for their 
own client. Thereby, both have 
evidence that the other lawyer has 
actually communicated a correct 
and considered (as compared to a 
routine) advice. If Hoult and Parker 
are followed, they will indeed halt 
pre-nups and mid-nups. No doubt 
subsequent case law will attempt to 
modify this clumsy consequence. 
reduce client costs; and certainly do 
not witness the mutual hand over of 
more comprehensive copies of 
letters or videos of advice  to each 
spouse and to the other lawyer—let 
alone before the client signs. 
( Compare failure of both lawyers in 
Neal v Jacovou [2011] NSWSC 87 to 
check the fast advice given by one 
of them under a state TFM 
contractual release). 
9. It is likely that creeping case law will 
develop duties of each lawyer, not 
only to her/his own client, but also 
to the other client eg Noll & Noll & 
Anor [2011] Fam CA 872. (Compare 
the duty of a will drafter not only to 
the “client” testator, but also to 
beneficiaries). These duties may 
develop under the umbrella of 
avoiding “false or misleading” 
behaviour as required by state or 
federal consumer protection 
legislation. A lawyer would be wise 
to say little or nothing in the 
presence of the “other” spouse; 
specify that all correspondence is to 
be shown only to her his own client; 
and scrupulously ensure that any 
statement in the agreement (eg “I 
gave independent and 
comprehensive legal advice just 
before the agreement was signed”) 
is true! 
9. Lawyers are not aware of the 
dormant duty to the “other side”; 
and in the ebb and flow of 
conversations, letters and drafting, 
often state “half truths” (eg this is 
“final”; “watertight”; “I have given 
the necessary advice” etc). 
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10. Before 4 January 2010, perhaps 95% 
of pre nuptial agreements in 
Australia were not binding because 
of one or more “technical” errors 
under convoluted old s 90G. The list 
of technical requirements under  
s 90G has been retrospectively 
reduced. However traps remain; 
(and the Hoult and Parker direction 
have multiplied the traps). For 
example, every time a draft financial 
agreement is amended in any 
minute way, each lawyer must give 
fresh advice just before each client 
finally signs (eg s 90G (i); 90UJ(i)); eg 
Parker and Parker [2010] Fam CA 
664; [2012] Fam CAFC33). It is 
common for agreements to be 
amended multiple times, even to 
correct spelling errors. 
10. Many lawyers do not know or 
comply with even the reduced list of 
procedural “traps” which have 
survived in s 90G and s 90UJ. 
11. Due to residual procedural errors 
still possible under s 90G, each 
lawyer should require either: (a) all 
signings to take place in one room in 
front of all parties and lawyers; or 
(b) each lawyer to swap separate 
written warranties (immediately 
after signing) that all requirements 
in his/her control under s 90G(1) 
have been performed by him/her. 
11. Many agreements are not signed in 
a rugby scrum, but are posted from 
one signatory site to another; or 
signed in separate rooms 
AND few lawyers would request 
performance warranties; or be 
willing to give such warranties 
which double the plaintiffs in a 
future professional negligence 
claim. 
12. “Limping” and belatedly binding 
agreements. A further procedural 
sting has remained in the tail of s 90 
G(1) (ca). This subsection requires 
that a copy of each signed 
statement of advice be provided to 
the other spouse or his/her legal 
practitioner, with no time limit on 
this double handover.( eg Hoult 
[2011]FamCA 1023) So the 
agreement may be non-binding for 
say 20 years ( or forever) unless and 
until (a) both handovers occur; (b) 
to  living, sane, non-dementia and 
accessible  partners; or (c) to 
lawyers who happens to still be 
employed by the recipient spouses 
12. See above. Most lawyers are not 
aware of this sting in the tail; and do 
not use rugby scrums; or witness 
and record instant handovers of 
statements of advice; or give 
written warranties of compliance; or 
handover comprehensive letters of 
advice (see 8 above). 
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( very unlikely); and (d) of copies of 
both statements which still exist; 
and (e) with credible evidence that 
both handovers occurred! Again, 
presumably subsequent case law 
will attempt to patch up this 
awkward literal interpretation with 
vague phrases like “reasonable 
time”. 
13. As the allegations about either 
procedural error; or duress; or haste 
will arise say 5-30 years later when 
all memories are faded and 
reconstructed, it is essential that 
each lawyer writes a lengthy record 
of events relating to capacity and 
“technical compliance” 
AND somehow stores that written 
record in at least one secure safe, 
similar to a safe for wills. The file 
must never be “thrown out”. 
13. In reality, the majority of lawyers 
neither make such copious records; 
or store them safely; or charge 
clients appropriate fees if they do 
so. 
14. Many clients who want these 
agreements are from other cultures 
and English is not their primary 
language. It is essential that 
translators be hired; and that copies 
of the agreements be signed both in 
English and in certified primary 
language versions. 
14. The expense of all of this, and the 
reality that the stronger party often 
does not want the weaker party to 
“understand”, means this rarely 
occurs. 
15. To avoid inevitable professional 
negligence accusations years later, 
each lawyer must provide his/her 
own client with a carefully drafted 
letter and/or video setting out a list 
of situations when the financial 
agreement will not be binding 
(including all of the comments in 
this list!). Clients should not be sold 
a product based on false 
representations or impressions of 
“finality”. The client should sign and 
return a copy of such letter of 
advice to provide long term 
evidence of understanding that 
(s)he is buying a leaky product. 
Hoult and Parker also lead to the 
argument that such a letter or video 
15. On this requirement, lawyers are 
necessarily damned. The protective 
letter of advice must be given by 
each lawyer to reduce the number 
of professional negligence 
categories and accusations. 
However, those who draft such 
letters know that they are either too 
simple; or too legalistic to be 
accurate and understood. Moreover 
every list of exceptions is necessarily 
incomplete; and that a generic 
clause “there are other emerging 
exceptions” scares clients away! 
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of exceptions is now essential ( not 
optional) to “binding”(ness), as 
s.90G(1) mandates advice “about 
the effect [and therefore non-
effect] of the agreement on the 
rights [and therefore non-rights] of 
[the client]” 
 
 
16. To avoid professional negligence, it 
is essential that each lawyer explain 
in writing the complex proposition 
that the agreement is not final post-
death. That is, the survivor can 
attempt an amendment or “second 
bite” of finances under state TFM 
legislation. 
 
16. In many cases, this large “hole” in 
finality is neither explained in 
writing, or understood by clients. 
17. In NSW, it is possible for the clients 
to agree to undertake a Supreme 
Court application to overcome the 
major post death exception to 
finality (s95 Succession Act 2006 
(NSW)). Lawyers should strongly 
advise such an immediate step in 
writing, and structure the financial 
agreement with extra periodic 
payments as incentives to do so; 
and make it clear that the severable 
financial agreement survives even if 
the Succession Act release is 
unsuccessful; and pay for extensive 
legal advice  (definitely more than 
one interview) for BOTH parties; 
and ensure that the release 
payments are “generously ” within 
the current and predicted TFM 
ranges. 
17. In reality in NSW, few clients 
“bother” to go through the 
expensive procedure under s 31 of 
Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW), 
though an executor can attempt to 
do so after one partner’s death (eg 
Neal v Jacovou [2011] NSWSC 87). 
Moreover, lawyers usually do not do 
one or more of the following: record 
their recommendations in writing; 
together with staggered payments 
to provide incentives to complete 
Supreme Court approval; nor do 
they expressly sever the TFM 
release terms from the financial 
agreement; or pay for extensive 
independent TFM legal advice; or 
make generous post death provision 
( usually the opposite). 
18. Theoretically, if spouses want to 
vary or “terminate” a financial 
agreement, they should do so by 
preparing and signing a new formal 
financial agreement with its 
attendant expense and formality (s 
90J; 90UL). 
18. Most clients do not bother. They 
“vary” the formal agreement by 
casual conversations and 
inconsistent behaviour; thereby 
triggering uncertainty about the 
status of the formal agreement 
under the common law of estoppel, 
waiver, implied variation of contact 
and promissory estoppel (s 90KA; 
90UN). 
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19. Technical and other defects in 
financial agreements which render 
them “non-binding” under s90G can 
be “fixed” in limited and expensive 
circumstances under s90G(1A). 
However, those are limited, 
uncertain and untested 
circumstances, which will save very 
few lawyers or clients (Senior and 
Anderson [2011] FamCA 802)  
 .    19.  Most specialist family lawyers are 
aware  that s90G(1A) offers rare salvation.  
Less aware lawyers (and their clients) may 
discover this “just and equitable” rescue 
section in times of trouble, though usually 
in vain. ( In Wallace and Stelzer [2011] 
FamCA 54, Benjamin J assisted the parties 
with the exercise -- “even if the agreement 
is not binding or is set aside, these are the 
just and equitable orders I would have 
made”) 
 
If the above analysis is correct, 
(1) Why are any lawyers in Australia willing to draft pre-nuptial (s 90B) financial 
agreements? 
(2) How can lawyers and clients be effectively “warned” about the risks attached to pre-
nuptial financial agreements? 
(3) Should lawyers be advised to send letters to all clients AND their partners for whom 
they drew up pre-nuptial agreements under s90B, advising them their agreement is 
increasingly unlikely to be binding, and not to rely on it? And send copies of such 
correspondence to their professional insurers? 
Post Nuptial (s 90D; s90UD) Agreements 
The  avalanche of warnings set out above in relation to prenups (s 90B; s90UB) and 
midnups (s 90C; s90UC), do not apply to the same extent to “postnuptial” financial 
agreements under s 90D or s90UD of the FLA.  These are agreements entered into after 
the breakdown of a de facto relationship, or after divorce of a married couple.  
This is because even though there are almost certainly technical errors in many s90D 
and s90UD postnup financial agreements, which thereby render them “non-binding”, 
this usually does not matter. Why? Because before the error is discovered, the 
agreement is usually fully performed; and because such post separation agreements are 
not negotiated in the haze of romance; and because the terms of such s90D agreements 
are usually “in the range” of s79 orders, and so the desire to renege is less prevalent. 
(Contra Parker [2012] FamCAFC33 where the allegedly unfair agreement under s90C was 
signed after an initial separation). 
Nevertheless, lawyers as risk managers understand the normal incidence of post-
settlement blues. Therefore, the increasing potential for even s90D and s90UD 
agreements to be non-binding prior to full performance, unless expensive and intrusive 
signing protocols are followed exactly, will undoubtedly mean that informed lawyers will 
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abandon postnup s90D and s90UD agreements  for a time, and use consent orders 
instead to formalise financial settlements. 
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APPENDIX 
“Termination” Terminology and Financial Agreements under the Family Law 
Act 
 
Financial Agreements in Australia at present can be: 
1. “Not binding” for technical defects at the time of entry (s 90G); or at the time of 
entry one party engaged in “unconscionable” conduct (s 90K (1)(e); 90UM). 
2. “Set aside” only by a court order for a limited list of post entry events (s 90K; 
90UM). 
3. “Rescinded” or “varied” by one of the parties if it is “void, voidable or 
unenforceable” under normal common law and equitable principles which apply to 
contracts.  (s.90KA; 90UN). However, the parties’ decision to rescind can be 
overruled or confirmed by the Family Court (s 90KA; 90UN). 
4. “Terminated” (s 90J; 90UL) by another consensual financial agreement with 
equivalent degree of formality and statements (s 90J; 90UL). 
 
 
 
 
